Author: suheillaher

Gender Equity and Quran 4:34

A previous post showed the basic spiritual equality of men and women, as derived from the Quran. We now need to look more closely at three verses that are sometimes misunderstood to conclude an automatic superiority for men:

(i) “Men are in charge of [taking care of] women by [right of] what Allah has given one over the other and what they spend [for maintenance] from their wealth. ” (Qur’an, 4:34)

(ii) “And due to the wives is similar to what is expected of them, according to what is reasonable. But the men have a degree over them.” (Qur’an, 2:228)

(iii) “And the male is not like the female.” (Qur’an, 3:36)

(i) Men are qawwamun over women”

“Men are in charge of [taking care of] women by [right of] what Allah has given one over the other and what they spend [for maintenance] from their wealth. ” (Qur’an, 4:34)

Firstly, the Qur’an has told us clearly that the criterion for superiority before Allah is taqwa, not gender:

“Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you.” (Qur’an, 49:13)

Indeed, no Muslim man would dare claim that, merely by being male, he is better than Lady Khadijah, Lady Fatimah, or the Virgin Mary!

Remember also that two verses before this (4:32), we were reminded that men and women have each been blessed in different ways by Allah. What the verse 4:34 is telling us, therefore, is that men have the responsibility of taking care of women, because (generally) their constitution and nature are such that they are more capable or working and providing physical protection and defense.

Secondly, note that the wording is not فضلهم عليهن (which would clearly mean: graced/blessed men over  women) but rather: بِمَا فَضَّلَ ٱللَّهُ بَعْضَهُمْ عَلَىٰ بَعْضٍ literally: “has graced some of them over others.”  Shaykh al-Sha`rawi, the famous 20th-century Egyptian (male) scholar of tafsir, pointed out that although men may be graced/blessed in one aspect, they are less endowed in other respects, and that the two genders have complementary roles in which each utilizes their respective strengths to support the other. The 3rd-century theologian and polymath `Uthman al-Jahiz has pointed out several aspects in which women can be considered superior to men, including various positive traits of character (remember the Prophet (s) was described as more modest than a virgin in her chamber), and the fact that there has been a woman (the Virgin Mary) for whom Allah created a child without male involvement, but there has never ben a man for whom Allah made a child without female involvement. Contemporary female Syrian scholar Hanan Lahham expressed succinctly the logical conclusion to make from 4:34, tying together the concepts that were already known to earlier exegetes (mufassireen), even if they didn’t express it so explicitly. She writes that, “Allah granted to each gender characteristics that help them to perform their roles; the intended meaning is not a superiority of one gender over the other.”

The verse (4:34) also intimates that some women have certain superiorities over some men, and vice-versa. Thus, some women might be physically stronger, or more capable breadwinners, than some men. None of this is ruled out by the verse, nor by the labelling of men as maintainers, because as `Allamah Ibn `Ashur (a high-ranking 20th century Tunisian scholar) has commented in his tafsir, what the verse is describing is not a universal but a customary norm. (We may note, in passing that patriarchically organized societies have dominated human history for several millenia.) Even among pre-modern mufassirin, the possibility had been raised that this verse conveys that there are some women who are better than many men. In fact, the famous medieval linguist and mufassir, Abu Hayyan al-Andalusi, mentioned the possibility (suggested by the verse) that the term “men” (الرجال) in the verse (4:34) refers not to gender (for otherwise the term “males” (الذكور) could have been used) but only to those males who are deserving of being called “men” by virtue of their strength, wisdom and resoluteness. A lot of women would not be able to fully respect a man who does not live up to his expected role. Thus, many of the fuqaha allow a wife to annul the marriage if the husband is not able to provide financial support to his wife. (Of course, she has the option of remaining with him and being patient, and also the option of spending her own money on the household, and can expect reward from Allah for doing so, but she is not obliged to do either of these).

 

-Suheil Laher

Spiritual Equality of Men and Women

Umm Salamah asked the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him), “Why is it that men are mentioned in the Qur’an, but we women are not mentioned?” In response, Allah sent down a verse1.

“Indeed, the Muslim men and Muslim women, the believing men and believing women, the obedient men and obedient women, the truthful men and truthful women, the patient men and patient women, the humble men and humble women, the charitable men and charitable women, the fasting men and fasting women, the men who guard their private parts and the women who do so, and the men who remember Allah often and the women who do so – for them Allah has prepared forgiveness and a great reward.” (Qur’an, 33:35)

This is one of several Qur’anic verses that establishes the essential spiritual equality of men and women. Other verses tell us that believers – men and women – will receive light on the Day of Judgment, will enter Paradise, will not be wronged in the least, will be rewarded according to the best of their actions, and will be given provision without account. (See: Qur’an, 3:195, 4:124, 16:97. 40:40, 57:12).

Hence, Muslim scholars often mention a general principle:

النساء شقائق الرجال

Women are the counterparts of men.”2

This means that every right and obligation that applies to men applies equally to women, unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. Remember that, given the societal setup and norms of 7th-century Arabia, the Prophet (s) was, naturally, spending more time with men than with women, and so the wording of his statements would nomally be addressed in the male gender. Hence, when we find hadiths about marying for beauty, or desiring to have children, or remaining faithful to one’s spouse, even though many of these hadiths are addressed to men, we are entitled to deduce a similar, reciprocal ruling for women.

Notwithstanding the essential spiritual equality of men and women, there are areas in which they are not identical, and some of these (like childbearing) are physiological and (in a sense) inevitable.

“And do not wish for that by which Allah has made some of you exceed others. For men is a share of what they have earned, and for women is a share of what they have earned. And ask Allah of his bounty. Indeed Allah is ever, of all things, Knowing.” (Qur’an, 4:32)

These differences do not mean men are superior, nor that women are superior. According to a report from Qatadah and al-Suddi (tafsir scholars of the Tabi`in, the above verse was revealed in response to some men who thought that they were entitled to double reward due to their gender, and some women who thought the punishment for their sins would be half that of men’s. 

Allah has made each gender unique and special in its own way, and we are expected to realize and accept this. 

To be continued — Part 2 examines three Quranic verses that are sometimes cited in support of an inherent male superiority, and shows how the verses do not support that conclusion.

— Suheil Laher

FOOTNOTES

1Ibn Kathir judged its chain of transmission as good (hasan) in Tuhfat al-Talib, as did Ibn Hajar in Muwafaqat al-Khabar. Tabari mentions several similar narrations in his exegesis (tafsir).

2 These words are also contained in a hadith, narrated by Abu Dawud, Tirmidhi and others, but there is disagreement over one of the narrators, `Abd-Allah ibn `Umar al-`Umari, who was an upright man, but whom some critics judged to have poor memory. Nevertheless, Ibn al-Qattan apparently judged it as a sound hadith. And Allah knows best.

Islamic Regulations regarding Acknowledgment (of Obligation or Responsibility)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

(OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OR RESPONSIBILITIES)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION by Suheil Laher from

Kitab al-Iqrar in Mukhtasar al-Quduri

(a summary-text of Hanafi law).

Rulings presented are as inferred from Qur’an and Sunnah by scholars of the Hanafi school.

1.0 MONEY OR ITEMS OWED

  1. If a free, adult, sane [person] confesses to a right [due] upon him, his acknowledgment is binding upon him, whether what he confesses to is unknown or know, and he is instructed, “Clarify the unknown.
    • If he says, “I owe something to so-and-so ,” he must describe something that has value. His word is taken in the matter, along with an oath, if the person to whom the debt is acknowledged claims it to be more than that.
    • If he says, “I owe so-and-so money,” then recourse is made to him to clarify it, and his word is taken in [the case of his specifying] either a little or a lot.
      • [But] if he says, “I owe so-and-so a lot of money,” his word is not accepted for less than 200 dirhams, and if he says, “[I owe] many dirhams,” then he is not believed in [any amount] less than 10 dirhams.
      • If he [simply] says, “dirhams,” then [it is taken as 3, unless he specifies more than that.
        • If he says, “I owe him kadha kadha (such-such) dirhams,” he is not believed if [he claims it to be] less than 11 dirhams. If he says, kadha wa kadha (such and such) dirhams, then he is not believed if [he claims it to be] less than 21 dirhams.
  1. If he says, “I owe him,” or “I am liable to him (lahu qibali),” then he has confessed to a debt, whereas if he says, “I have….”, or “There is with me….” then it is an acknowledgment of a wadi`a (item deposited with him for safekeeping) in his custody.
  2. If a man says to him, “You owe me a thousand,” and he says, “Take it by weight, “ or “Take it in cash,” or “Give me an extension,” or, “I will pay it back to you, “ then it is an acknowledgment.

2.0 DUE-DATES AND EXCLUSIONS

  1. If someone admits to a deferred debt, and the one to whom he acknowledges [the debt] affirms him in the [existence of] the debt, but claims he is lying about the deferral,  then he is obliged to pay the debt immediately, [but] the plaintiff is made to swear an oath concerning the deferral.
  2. If someone admits [to an amount] but without delay he excepts some [amount] from his admission, is obliged to pay the remainder, regardless of whether he excepted a small or large amount. But if he excepted the entire amount, he is obliged to pay the entire amount, and his exception is void.
  3. If he says, “I owe him 200 dirhams, less one dinar” or “less a qafiz of wheat,” then he is obliged to pay 200 dirhams less the value of the dinar or the qafiz. But if he says, “I owe him one hundred and a dirham,” then the 100 are all [taken to be] dirhams. If he says, “ I owe him 100 and a garment” then he is asked to clarify what the 100 are.
  4. If someone acknowledges a debt but adds, “if God wills,” without delay, then his acknowledgment is not considered binding upon him.
  5. If someone acknowledges [a debt] but stipulates his having a choice [“I owe you, if I want”], then his acknowledgment is  binding, and his stipulation of choice is void.
  6. If someone acknowledges [owing] a home, but makes an exception for its building for himself. Then the one to whom he acknowledges [the debt] is entitled to the home and the building, but if he says, “the building of this property is mine, but the lot belongs to so-and-so,” then it is [considered to be] as he described.
  7. If someone acknowledges dates in a straw container (qawsarra) is liable for the dates and the straw container. But if someone acknowledges an animal in a stable, he is liable only for the animal.
  8. If he says, “I took a garment in a cloth,” he is liable for both, and [similarly] if he says, “a garment in a garment.” But if he says, “I took a garment in 10 garments,” then he is liable for only one garment according to Abu Hanifah and Abu Yusuf. Muhammad said: he is liable for 11 garments.

.

3.0 ISSUES INVOLVING HEIRS

  1. If someone says, “I owe 1,000 to the unborn child with whom so-and-so is pregnant,” then if he says, “So-and-so left it as a bequest for him,” or “His father died, so he inherits it,” then the acknowledgment is valid, but if he did not specify then it is not valid according to Abu Yusuf. But if he declares that a man is entitled to the unborn fetus of a ewe, the declaration is valid and binding
  2. If a man in his terminal illness admits to debts, and he [already] has [known] debts incurred during his healthy days, as well as debts incurred for known causes during his illness, then the debts from his healthy days and the known debts from his illness are given priority over others. If those are paid, and there remains something [of his money] then it goes towards the debt he admitted to. But if he did not have prior debts, then the admission is binding, and the creditor has more right to the money than the heirs.
  3. A man’s acknowledgment of a debt to his heir is void, unless the other heirs all confirm it.
  4. If someone in his [last] illness acknowledges a debt to [someone thought to be] a non-relative, then says, “He is my son.” Then his lineage is established but the acknowledgment of debt is void. But if he acknowledges a debt to an unrelated woman, then marries her, the acknowledgment of debt is not voided.
  5. If someone in his [last] illness divorces his wife thrice [or less]  [at her request] then acknowledges a debt to her and dies while she is in the waiting-period] then she is entitled to the lesser amount of the debt and her inheritance [because they might have colluded to use the divorce as a means to validate the acknowledgment].

4.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS

  1. If someone acknowledges [paternity] of a boy, the like of whom could be born to the like of him, and [the boy] has no known lineage, his paternity is established even if [the man] is sick, and [the boy] shares in the inheritance with the [other] heirs.
  2. A man’s acknowledgment of someone as his parent, child, wife or freed-slave is valid.
  3. A woman’s acknowledgment of someone as her parent, husband, or freed-slave is valid, but [if she is married or in her waiting period then] her acknowledgment of someone as her child is not valid unless the husband affirms her or a midwife testifies to the birth [in which case the paternity is ascribed to her husband].

Islamic Regulations of Hunting and Slaughtering (Food)

FOOD (HUNTING AND SLAUGHTERING)”

Translated by Suheil Laher from

Kitab al-Sayd wal-Dhaba’ih in Mukhtasar al-Quduri

(a summary-text of Hanafi law), with some re-arrangement and editing.

Rulings presented are as inferred from Qur’an and Sunnah by scholars of the Hanafi school.

DISCLAIMER: Information presented here is for informational purposes only, and should not be construed as a call to perform or abstain from any specific action mentioned in the text. Religious decisions should be taken with due care and thought, after reading and investigating, but also after consulting with reliable people of knowledge – who are aware of one’s particular circumstances – and then pondering and exercising one’s conscience.

 

    • Permissibility
    • Use of Animals
    • Shooting

 

 

    • Conditions
    • The Animal
    • Types

 

 

1.0 HUNTING

1.1 Permissibility

1. The hunting of a Zoroastrian, apostate or idolater may not be eaten.

2. It is permissible to hunt those animals whose meat may be eaten [for the purpose of acquiring food],
and also those which may not be eaten [for the purpose of non-food benefits and/or prevention of harm].

  • If one slaughters that whose meat may not be eaten, its flesh and skin become pure [but not permissible to eat], except for the human and the pig, for slaughter does not have any effect on them [i.e. they remain impermissible both to consume and to use]

1.2 Use of Animals

1. It is permissible to hunt with a trained dog, panther, falcon, or any other trained predatory animal or bird.

  • The training of a dog is : that it refrain from eating three times.
  • The training of a falcon is : that it return when you call it.

2. So, if one sends his trained dog, or falcon, or hawk, and mentions the name of Allah, the Exalted upon it at the time of sending, and then [the animal] seizes the prey and wounds it such that it dies, it is permissible to eat it.

  • If the dog eats from it, [the prey] may not be eaten, but if the falcon eats from it, it can be eaten.
  • If the dog strangles [the prey] and does not wound it, it may not be eaten.
  • If an untrained dog – or a Zoroastrian’s dog, or a dog on which the name of Allah, the Exalted was not mentioned – participated with [the trained dog], [the prey] may not be eaten.

3. If the sender reaches the prey alive, it is obligatory upon him to slaughter it, and so if he refrains from slaughtering it until it died, then it may not be eaten.

1.3 Shooting

1. If a man shoots an arrow at prey, and mentions the name of Allah at the time of shooting, he may eat what he strikes provided the arrow wounded it so that it died [as a result]. But, if he reaches it alive, he [must] slaughter it, and so if he refrains from slaughtering it until it died, then it may not be eaten.

  • If the arrow strikes, and the animal struggles [and moves] so that it disappears from him, but he continues to pursue it until he overcomes it dead, it may be eaten. But, if he sat back from pursuing it, and then came upon
    it dead, it may not be eaten.
  • If he strikes quarry which then falls into the water and dies, it may not be eaten.
  • Similarly, if it falls on an inclined surface or mountain, and then tumbles down to the ground, it may not be eaten, but if it falls to the ground initially, it may be eaten.
  • If someone shoots a quarry, and strikes it without incapacitating it nor preventing it from escaping, and then someone else shoots it and kills it, it is his and may be eaten. But, if the first one incapacitates it and then the second one kills it, it may not be eaten, and the latter must reimburse the former for its price less its wound

2. That which a featherless arrow strikes with its breadth may not be eaten, but if it wounds [the quarry] it may be eaten.

  • That which is struck by a pebble may not be eaten if it dies from that.

3. If one shoots at quarry and severs a piece from it, [the animal] may be eaten, but the piece may not be eaten. But, if he cuts it in thirds, and the major portion is adjacent to the rump, then it may [all]be eaten. If the major portion is adjacent ot the head, the larger portion may be eaten, but the lesser one may not.

2.0 SLAUGHTERING

2.1 Conditions for Slaughtering

1. The slaughter of a Muslim or a Kitabi is permissible [to eat].

  • The slaughter of a Zoroastrian, apostate, idolator, or of [a Muslim] in ihram may not be eaten.

2. If the slaughterer omitted the pronouncment of the name [of Allah] deliberately, then the slaughter is carrion which may not be eaten. But, if he left it out forgetfully, it may be eaten.

3. The vessels which must be severed in slaughtering are four : the trachea, the oesophagus and the two jugular veins. So, if he cut [all] these, eating [from the animal] is permissible. If he cut most of them, then similarly [it is valid] according to Abu Hanifah. Abu Yusuf and Muhammad said : it is essential to cut the trachea, the oesophagus and one of the two jugular veins.

  • If one reaches the spinal cord with the knife, or severs the head, that is repugnant for him [to do], but the slaughter may be eaten.
  • If one slaughters a ewe from the back of its head, then if it remains alive until he severs the [required] vessels it is valid but repugnant. But, if it dies before the cutting of the vessels it may not be eaten.

4. It is permissible to slaughter with a sharp reed or stone, or anything that causes the blood to flow out, except for an intact tooth or an intact nail.

It is recommended that the slaughterer sharpen his blade.

2.2 The Sacrifical Animal

1. An animal with severed ears or [severed] tail does not suffice, nor one from which the major part of the ear has gone. But, if the major portion of the ear or tail remains, it is permissible.

2. It is valid to sacrifice a hornless animal, a castrated animal, a mangy animal [provided it is plump], or an insane
animal [provided it is plump].

3. Animal-sacrifice is [only] from amongst camels, cows and sheep [or goats].

A thaniyy [two-year old cow/buffalo or five-year old camel, or one-year old sheep/goat], or better, of [any of] these suffices, except for the sheep, of which a jadha` [well-built six-month old] suffices.

4. If one performs nahr on a camel, or slaughters a cow or sheep, and then finds in its belly a dead fetus, it may not be eaten, [egardless of] whether its features are discernible or not.

2.3 Methods of Slaughter

1. Domesticated game must be slaughtered, and wild livestock may be wounded [as in hunting].

2. The recommended [technique] for camels is nahr [thrusting the knife into the base of the neck], but if one slaughters them, it is valid but disliked.

3. The recommended [technique] for cows and sheep is slaughtering, but if one performs nahr on them, it is valid but disliked.

3.0 WHAT MAY AND MAY NOT BE EATEN

1. It is not permissible to eat any canine-toothed beast of prey, nor any taloned [predatory] bird.

  • There is no objection to [eating] the agrarian crow, but the speckled one that eats corpses may not be eaten.
  • It is repugnant to eat the hyena.

2. [It is repugnant to eat the] lizard and all vermin.

3. It is not permissible to eat the flesh of the domesticated donkey or mule.

  • The meat of the horse is discouraged according to Abu Hanifah.

4. There is no objection to eating the rabbit.

5. Nothing may be eaten of the animals of the water except fish.

6. It is repugnant to eat floating [fish that died on their own].

7. There is no harm in eating the jirrith and eel

8. It is permissible to eat locusts, and there is no slaughter [needed] for them.

 

Lawful and Prohibited : Miscellaneous Islamic Regulations

PROHIBITION AND PERMISSIBILITY”

Translated by Suheil Laher from

Kitab al-Hazr wal-Ibaha in Mukhtasar al-Quduri

(a summary-text of Hanafi law), with some re-arrangement and editing.

Rulings presented are as inferred from Qur’an and Sunnah by scholars of the Hanafi school.

DISCLAIMER: Information presented here is for informational purposes only, and should not be construed as a call to perform or abstain from any specific action mentioned in the text. Religious decisions should be taken with due care and thought, after reading and investigating, but also after consulting with reliable people of knowledge – who are aware of one’s particular circumstances – and then pondering and exercising one’s conscience.

1.0 SILK

1. It is not permissible for men to wear silk, but it is permissible for women.

  • There is no harm in reclining on it according to Abu Hanifah. Abu Yusuf and Muhammad said : It is
    repugnant to recline on it.

2. There is no objection to wearing pure silk in war according to the two of them, but it is repugnant according to Abu Hanifah.

3. There is objection to wearing [clothing made of] a blended fabric if its warp is silk and its weft is cotton.

[

‘Blended fabric’ here refers to an interlaced or interwoven fabric, with warp and weft not of the same material.

Warp” is the set of threads held in tension on a loom.

Weft” is the set of threads interlaced with the warp.

]

2.0 GOLD AND SILVER

2.1 Jewelry and Decorations

1. It is not permissible for men to use jewelry of gold,

2. Nor [may they wear jewelry of] silver excepting:

  • a ring
  • [decorations of] a belt
  • the decoration of a sword from silver.

3. It is permissible for women to use jewelry of gold and silver.

4. It is repugnant to make a [minor] boy wear gold and silk.

5. It is disliked to mark verses in tens in the mushaf, and [also] to add diacritical dots [when
not needed for correct reading].

6. There is no objection to decorating the mushaf, [nor to] engraving mosques and decorating them [on
the outside] with gold-water.

2.2 Vessels

1. It is not permissible to eat, drink, use oil or perfume from vessels of gold or silver, neither for men nor for women.

  • It is permissible to drink from a silver-decorated vessel according to Abu Hanifah, and [similarly] to
    ride on a silver-decorated saddle and to sit on a silver-decorated bed [provided one avoids contact with the areas of silver]

2. There is no objection to using vessels of glass, crystal or cornelian.

[“Cornelian” is a reddish-white variety of quartz.]

3.0 LOOKING AND TOUCHING

3.1 Looking at Women

1. It is not permissible for a man to look at a stranger-woman, except at her face and hands. But, if he
did not consider himself safe from lust, he may not look at her face except out of need.

  • [But] it is permissible for
    • the judge, when he wishes to pass judgement over her
    • the witness, when he wishes to testify concerning her
    • [the suitor, when he is considering proposing marriage to her]

to look at her face, even if he fears he may experience lust.

    • It is permissible for the doctor to look at the afflicted spot on her.
  • The [regulation] of a eunuch regarding looking at a stranger-woman is like [the regulation for] a
    non-eunuch.

2. A man may look at his mahram’s (i.e. permanently umarriageable female relatives’) face, head, chest,
shins and arms, but he may not look at their back or belly. There is objection to touching what it is permissible to look at [of the mahrams] [for a legitimate reason, i.e. provided there is no fear of lust or other inappropriate consequences].

3. A man may look at his wife [entirely] including [even] her genitals.

  • One may not practise coitus interruptus with his wife except with her permission.

4. A woman may look at that [much] of another woman that a man may look at of another man.

3.2 Looking at Men

1. A man may look at all of the body of another man except for what is between his navel to his knee.

2. It is permissible for a woman to look at that [part] of a man which another man may look at.

3. It is repugnant to employ the service of eunuchs [if that involves perpetuation of the
practice of castration, which is a prohibited act of mutilation]

  • There is no harm in castrating cattle, nor in mating a donkey with a horse.

4.0 CREDIBILITY

2. It is permissible to accept, in [the matter of] a gift or permission, the word of a child or servant.

3. The word of a transgressor is acceptable in transactions [and other mundane matters]

4. Only the word of a morally upright (`adl) person is acceptable in religious matters.

5.0 TRADE

1. Hoarding of staple-foods of humans and cattle is repugnant, if that is in a land in which hoarding harms
the inhabitants.

2. One who hoards the produce of his [own] estate, or what he has imported from another land, is not [termed] a hoarder.

3. It is not appropriate for the ruler to regulate prices for people [as long as they do not reach the level
of exploitation, which is harmful to the public interest]

4. It is repugnant to sell weapons in times of fitna [i.e. turmoil (in which the side of truth is unclear) or sedition (in which there is unjustified rebellion against a legitimate ruler and one is selling weapons to the rebels)]

5. There is no [judicial] objection to selling juice to someone whom it is known will produce wine from it [but notwithstanding the absence of worldly prosecution, the seller might still be sinful in the spiritual domain].

Chivalric Glory and Extremist Ignominy

By Suheil Laher

Chivalry and bravery have long been valued as noble human qualities. I remember a picture book in the library of my Kindergarten 2 class (at St Margaret’s Kindergarten School) about King Arthur’s knights, who are often regarded as emblematic of such ideals in the West. Jihad in Islam includes not only an inner dimension of spiritual struggle, but also an external dimension of helping the weak and striving against injustice. Extremist jihadi groups like ISIS appeal to Muslim youth (and others) on the basis of the latter, but by selective, decontextualized citations from an amalgam of history, medieval law and Islamic sacred texts, they bypass the honorable chivalrous teachings, higher objectives and profound vision of sacred law that are held to by mainstream Muslim scholars.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 drew widespread international condemnation, including a resolution by the UN General Assembly. In accordance with both the UN Charter[1] and the Islamic understanding of self-defence against aggression, Afghans as well as many non-Afghan Muslims rallied against the Soviet intervention. The liberation effort was widely recognized in the Muslim world as a glorious jihad, and the United States government (among other Western and Eastern non-Muslim nations) was openly and actively providing financial, material, and moral support to the mujahideen. Naturally, many American Muslims also either supported the Afghan jihad or looked upon it favorably.

It was a euphoric time, but it was not to last. After the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan in 1989, and the toppling of the Soviet-backed president in 1992, things took  a darker turn. Civil war broke out among the mujahideen in Afghanistan, and some of the foreign mujahideen were left grappling with post-war trauma, along with the difficulty of reintegration into civilian life, compounded by their being unwelcome in some of their home countries due to fears that they would harness popular grievances to foment revolution against those Middle Eastern governments.

It was in such circumstances that some of the former mujahideen began to move in a new direction: away from the honorable chivalry of true jihad towards an ignominous extremist ideology. Al-Qaeda, and eventually ISIS were born. Extremists might capitalize on the acclaimedly glorious status of the Afghan jihad, to present themselves as its heirs and perpetuators. But in Islam, actions are validated by sacred texts, not by appeals to charismatic lineage. A religious rhetoric, similar to that which was once used to enthuse Muslims with the noble spirit of just resistance against Soviets, has now been subverted and perverted to call towards extremism and terrorism. The rhetoric is similar, and might appeal to some of the same principles (such as resisting oppression) and sacred texts, but the big difference is that it is now out of touch with the noble chivalry of true jihad that we find in the Qur’an and Sunna.

I advise Muslims (including, but not limited to, Muslim youth) not to be duped by half-baked religious rhetoric. To realize that while injustices exist in the world, and jihad continues until the day of Judgment, nevertheless true jihad must be carried out through legitimate and honorable means. Radical ISIS-style extremism is a crude and dangerous caricature of jihad. Exercise caution in your charitable giving, and don’t be deceived into thinking that you are helping Islam by supporting groups that are actually hurting the cause of Islam and Muslims. Do not capitulate to a cult mentality, where you take religious teaching from a limited set of scholars, who use emotions to make you feel that you would be betraying faith and justice if you listen to those who condemn terrorist acts. If you are not willing to listen to the other side, how can you be so sure you are correct? Did not the Prophet (peace be upon him) warn of people who would recite the Qur’an, and zealously worship and strive, and yet be a liability to Islam because of their lack of deeper understanding? Truth prevails, and Allah has given you a conscience and a mind that allow you to think for yourself. Islam is a profound religion that seeks to actualize lofty and noble objectives in both individual and society. If you refuse to think about and to see the bigger picture, and content yourself with a narrow tunnel-vision of Islam, I think you are short-changing yourself.

أما الخيام فإنها كخيامهم ** وأرى نساء الحي غير نساءها
(A poet describing with anguish how, in desparate search of the nomadic tribe of his fiancee, he discovers tents that look like their tents, only to discover that the people inhabiting them are different people.)

ENDNOTE
[1] “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” Chapter VII, Article 51.

Non-Muslim Minorities and Religious Tolerance

The arrival of Islamic rule marked an end to the persecution to which non-Zoroastrian minorities had been subjected in pre-Islamic Persia.[1] It is sadly strange then, that fourteen centuries later, Islam is now being invoked and interpreted in an attempt to exterminate such populations, and moreover to do so in grisly and inhumane ways that are themselves incongruous with Islam’s central values of kindness and compassion.

I was incredulous when I first read recent reports of members of the non-Muslim Yazidi minority in Iraq being killed and enslaved in the name of Islam. The reported actions troubled my conscience, and furthermore, for historical and theological reasons, did not sit right with my understanding of Islam. Yet, I was aware of statements in medieval books of Islamic law that might be produced as partial justification of the actions, and so I felt the need to articulate a coherent response to questions such as the following: As a Muslim, am I required to agree with such killing and enslavement? If they are correct, then how can it be that these religious minorities have survived fourteen centuries in the heart of the Islamic lands without yet having been exterminated?

The majority opinion among Muslim jurists, and the dominant operative view across Muslim history has been that of tolerance to all non-Muslim religious communities.  After explaining this to be the case, I will show how this view is also in line with a general Qur’anic principle backed by common sense.

Muslim scholars, across sects and the various legal schools, are in agreement that Jews and Christians, being People of Scripture, can live as subjects of the Islamic state, and are not forced to convert to Islam (although they are welcome and encouraged to do so). They are subject to a tax called the jizyah, which was paid, as British Orientalist Thomas Arnold Walker explains, “by those whose religion precluded them from serving in the army, in return for the protection secured for them by the armies of the Musulmans.”[2] Muslim scholars are further agreed that Zoroastrians can similarly live as subjects of the Islamic state, even though they are not decisively People of Scripture, because the Prophet Muhammad himself afforded them such treatment. Jurists of the Maliki school (which dominates North and West Africa), and the Zaydi Shi`ite school, along with Imam al-Awza`i (whose school was widely followed in the Levant and across North Africa before being displaced by the Malikis and Shafi`is), generalized from this to conclude that the same courtesy is extended to people of all religions. The Hanafi school (geographically and historically the school with the widest following among the public and the most implemented by rulers) concluded similarly, making an exception only for idolators of Arabia which is actually a moot point given that idolatry did not survive there following the large-scale conversions to Islam during the Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime. When the Muslims ruled Mogul India, the (idolatrous) Hindus remained tolerated under Hanafi legal doctrine.[3]

Reframing the preceding breakdown of views, we realize that the earliest schools of Islamic law and the most widely followed (Hanafi, Maliki and Awza`i), allow and tolerate non-Muslim minorities of any religion within the Islamic lands (i.e. the “Islamic state”). Given the status of these schools and their adoption by Muslim governments across the centuries (until the Muslim world was largely secularized in early modernity), this view has also been the operative view across the overwhelming bulk of Muslim history. The dissenting view (of the (later) Shafi`is and Hanbalis, along with the Imamis), for practical purposes, persisted as little more than hypothetical juristic cogitations, and perhaps as reminders of the more stark era of war in the Hebrew Bible, where for example we read that the city of Jericho (including even the women, children and beasts) was put to the sword apparently for idolatry.[4] That tolerance of all religious groups was the norm in Muslim history is reflected in the fact that the Mandaeans, Yazidis and others have survived and maintained a presence in Islamic lands to this day.

It is worthwhile to note that the dominant Islamic view, of tolerance towards other religious communities, is also backed by general Qur’anic principle, and by common sense. The Qur’anic principle is that, “There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of the] religion” (Qur’an, 2:256), and common sense confirms that a forced conversion is unlikely to be genuine. How can it be reasonable to suddenly expect Yazidis, who have been raised in their own religion all their lives, to suddenly give it up at the point of a sword or rifle? Thomas Jefferson wrote, “that if there be but one right [religion], and ours that one, we should wish to see the 999 wandering sects gathered into the fold of truth. But against such a majority we cannot effect this by force. Reason and persuasion are the only practicable instruments. To make way for these, free enquiry must be indulged.”[5] The Qur’an foreshadows these wise words of Jefferson’s:

“Then, [O Muhammad], would you compel the people in order that they become believers? And it is not for a soul to believe except by permission of Allah , and He will place defilement upon those who will not use reason.” (Qur’an, 10:99-100)

“[U]pon you is only the [duty of] notification, and upon Us is the account.” (Qur’an, 13:40)

“Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction, and argue with them in a way that is best. Indeed, your Lord is most knowing of who has strayed from His way, and He is most knowing of who is [rightly] guided.” [Qur’an, 16:125]

Further Considerations

So far, we have established that the majority and operative position across history has been tolerance of all non-Muslim religious communities. This is sufficient to refute the notion that the killing and enslavement of non-Muslims represents the majority of Muslims, and to dispel the idea that those actions are a clear and immutable Islamic teaching. But what if a Muslim claims that he wants to follow a minority position on religious tolerance, and to revive the practices of enslavement and concubinage? In what follows, I explain how such actions are actually inconsistent with several broader Islamic principles:

(i) The Qur’anic principle (backed by common-sense) of non-coercion in faith, already mentioned earlier (above).

(ii) The importance of priorities. Even if someone truly believes it justified to target the non-Muslim minorities, they should ask themselves: If these minorities were not exterminated by the Prophet, nor by the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, then how can a Muslim group today consider it their prerogative and priority to undertake such a genocide?

(iii) Categorical imperative: If we as Muslims are to exterminate or expel indigenous non-Muslims who have been living in a country for centuries, how are we better than the Zionists who attempt to do the same to indigenous Palestinians?

(iv) The use of inhumane techniques (such as attempting to inflict forced starvation on people because of their religion) contradict the Prophet Muhammad’s code of ethics in war and peace. When Thumama ibn Athal, a South Arabian chief, imposed a wheat embargo on the idolatrous Makkans to punish them for their mistreatment of the Muslims, Prophet Muhammad asked him to lift the embargo to prevent the starvation of the Makkan idolators and especially of their women and children.[6]

(v) The Prophetic paradigm calls for wisdom, which includes recognition of people’s sensibilities and thinking. The Prophet Muhammad once remarked to his wife that he would have liked to demolish the Ka`bah[7], and then to rebuild it according to the original pattern on which Prophet Abraham had built it. However, he refrained from this, citing as a reason the fact that people had only recently come out the state of idolatrous ignorance (and would therefore misconstrue his action as sacrilegous).[8] The fourth Caliph, the Prophet’s son-in-law `Ali, drawing attention to the importance of sensitivity in engaging people, said, “Speak to people with what they can relate to. Would you like for God and His Messenger to be considered liars?”[9] The renowned 19th century Hanafi Muslim jurist Ibn `Abidin wrote, in his didactic poem Rasm al-Mufti, “Customary norms are to be given consideration in the Sacred Law, and hence the legal determination may hinge upon it.” Actions such as forced conversions and enslavement surely have a bigger impact on the public than mere words, and taking a human life is clearly more drastic than demolishing a brick-structure. Even if (hypothetically) someone’s conscience is genuinely not troubled in the least by such actions as enslavement, they should ponder deeply the consequences of their actions on the image and perception of Islam among non-Muslims, and remind themselves that Islam’s mission is to be a source of blessing to all.

“We have not sent you [Muhammad], except as a blessing to all creatures.” [Qur’an, 21:107]


[1] “The followers of all those varied forms of faith could breathe again under a rule that granted them religious freedom and exemption from military service, on payment of a light tribute.” Thomas Arnold Walker, The Preaching of Islam: a history of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith, (Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co., 1896), 177.

[2] Walker, The Preaching of Islam, 55-57.

[3] See, for example, the following medieval references of Islamic law: Ibn `Abidin, Radd al-Muhtar; al-Qurtubi, Al-Jami` li-Ahkam al-Qur’an; Ahmad ibn Yahya al-Murtada, al-Azhar fi FIqh al-A’immahal-Athar.

[4] See: Joshua, 6:21.

[5] Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, ed. William Peden (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1982) 160.

[6] See: Ibn Hisham, Al-Sirah al-Nabawiyyah.

[7] The building, in Makkah, that Muslims believe was the first house of pure monotheistic worship on earth, built by Prophet Abraham.

[8] Narrated by Bukhari and Muslim.

[9] Narrated by Bukhari.